It was the opportunities afforded by experience as a military psychiatrist during the years of World War II, after completing psychoanalytic training in 1938, that first led the author to consider the potential value of psychoanalytic theory in the understanding of a wide range of patients for whom intensive insight therapy was not available. This interest, subsequently enriched by the concurrent practice of clinical psychoanalysis, has continued and expanded over the course of the years which have since intervened. Increasingly during this period the author's attention has been focused on the developmental significance of certain aspects of affective experience, with particular reference to the two symptoms most commonly encountered in the every-day practice of all psychiatrists, which are anxiety and depression, manifestations of which are equally common during normal developmental crises, situational stress, psychoneurosis, and psychotic illness. As Abraham wrote in 1911: "The affect of depression is as widely spread among all forms of neuroses as is that of anxiety" ( 1) .
In one earlier paper directly derived from wartime experiences, "Anxiety and the Capacity to Bear It" (9) , it was suggested that manifest anxiety and/or related neurotic symptom formation, however painful or temporarily disabling, should not be evaluated exclusively in the light of its pathological implications. The emergence, tolerance, and mastery of subjective anxiety should rather be understood as essential to both the developmental process and to the maintenance or recovery of mental health throughout life. Individuals, in briefest terms, who had previously been capable of acknowledging and tolerating subjective anxiety contingent on some recognition of internal danger, proved less vulnerable to real external threats than those whose earlier history had been characterized by substantial lack of subjective fear or anxiety during childhood, adolescence, and early maturity. Although such people appear to have been extremely well defended against the emergence of manifest anxiety in respect to internal threats, their persistent impairment suggested that they had been predisposed to pathological responses to perceived external danger which could not be denied. Between, however, the individuals who had been able to recognize, tolerate, and master secondary anxiety with substantial success and those who developed serious, wellestablished traumatic neuroses, a wide range of clinical conditions could be conceptualized which included not only manifest anxiety states but a number of symptomatic responses, including psychosomatic illness. In respect to anxiety three developmental features might thus be differentiated: namely, first, the initiation of anxiety as the signal of internal danger (this is now recognized as a relatively late acquisition); second, the tolerance of manifest anxiety during periods of stress, ' Training Analyst, The Boston Psychoanalytic Inwhether internally or externally deterstitute. Asst. Clin. Prof. Psychiat., Harvard Univ. Med. mined', and third, the potential to master School. Psychiatrist, Mass. Gen. Hosp., Boston. this anxiety by adaptive, progressive intrapsychic processes. The predisposition to different types of neurotic anxiety may by inference be classified in relation to e~ch of these developmental steps. Failure, in this context, to recognize and tolerate a significant amount of subjective anxiety may be consistent with the automatic unconscious mobilization of defences which under normal conditions serve externally adaptive purposes. The developmental failure nevertheless renders many apparently normal, healthy individuals vulnerable to pathological regression, if and when such defences are undermined. Relative failures in respect to the tolerance of manifest anxiety, on the .other hand, may result in periodic decompensation in response to severe or prolonged internal or external danger situations. Persons within this clinical group, however, though they may be temporarily disabled when anxiety exceeds the limits of individual tolerance, usually reconstitute without serious over-all impairment. Relative failures, finally, in respect to optimal mastery of anxiety, though consistent with tolerance of considerable discomfort, often lead to symptom formation, inhibition, and limited success in respect to significant adaptive goals. Such relative failures, because they interfere with the capacity to attain happiness may, as will be discussed later, represent one of the psychic situation predisposing individuals to the manifold forms of neurotic depression.
In this paper it is suggested that depression, like anxiety, may also be regarded as an affect, the development, tolerance, and mastery of which is an essential concomitant to both the developmental process and the later responses to disappointment, frustration and loss. This statement is in keeping with the ego psychological approach to depression introduced by Edward Bibring in his theoretical paper, "The Mechanism of Depression" (2) more than ten years ago. To quote: "Anxiety and depression represent diametrically opposed basic ego responses.
Anxiety as a reaction to danger indicates the ego's desire to survive ... in depression, the opposite takes place; the ego is paralyzed because it finds itself incapable to meet the danger." The depressive affect, as a basic ego state, however mild and transient, increases rather than decreases many of the problems relevant to our theoretical understanding of the manifold varieties of depression as a pathological symptom. In this context it may be suggested that the psychoanalyst is in an optimal position to explore the dynamic processes implicit to the emergence, tolerance, and mastery of subjective depression as a progressive maturational experience. Men and women capable of undergoing a successful clinical analysis are in general individuals potentially capable of achieving substantial psychological maturity. Understanding therefore of the depressive affect which in my experience inevitably becomes manifest during the course of successful psychoanalytic treatment, should throw considerable light on the developmental tasks which determine individual capacity to tolerate without severe disturbance the suffering which must be anticipated in response to the inevitable disappointments, losses, and frustrations of adult life. Such elucidation might also facilitate a developmental differentiation between early failures which render the individual relatively incapable of recognizing subjective depression, those which render the individual vulnerable to regressive responses because he cannot tolerate depression, and those which might be classified as normal, reactive, or neurotic depressions because, however painful they may be, they constitute a developmental challenge rather than a regressive threat.
In two papers, entitled "Depression and the Incapacity to Bear It" (10) and "The Theory of Therapy in Relation to a Developmental Model of the Psychic Apparatus" (11) , now in press, the author has discussed at some length the developmental tasks in question. Certain parallels have also been noted, particularly relevant to the emergence and mastery of affect between the original developmental process and later situational and maturational experiences. The major points which relate to the predisposition to depression concern those aspects of psychological maturity which require passive recognition and acceptance of the inevitable limitations of reality, both subjective and objective. Such recognition includes some experience of helplessness based on the definitive renunciation of omnipotent fantasies in respect to either the self or external sources of gratification. This necessarily implies loss of self esteem, a cardinal feature of depression as a subjective experience. Optimal development, however, not only includes this initial passive acceptance; it is also contingent on the capacity to mobilize available resources towards the achievement of realistic sources of gratification-i.e., an acceptance and achievement of the real both facilitates and/or follows renunciation of the impossible and/or unattainable. At least two prerequisites of affective maturity are thus concerned; namely, first, initiation of the capacity for passive acceptance which will remain an important concomitant of the ability to acknowledge with some objectivity realistic disappointments and losses over the passage of time, and second, the active mobilization of inner resources which determines the capacity to master both internal and external challenges and/or deprivations. Partial developmental failure may thus be complex. In certain individuals the first step, i.e., recognition of helplessness and limitations may not be followed by adequate mobilization of active resources. In others, in contrast, the mobilization of active resources may be premature and/or excessive. Such individuals, like those predisposed to traumatic neuroses, may tend to rely too heavily on their own active achievements and may thus prove vulnerable when, for whatever reason, their resources are substantially impaired.
In this paper, as in the earlier paper, it is hoped to elaborate and conceptualize the adaptive and prophylactic significance of certain manifestations of suffering experienced and mastered in an appropriate developmental context. The thesis which it is hoped to illustrate concerns factors which influence the capacity to recognize, tolerate, and ultimately to master subjective affect concomitant with the achievement and subsequent maintenance of psychological maturity. The first basic requirement for defining any affect as a genuine individual experience concerns the achievement and maintenance of selfobject differentiation. That such differentiation is either precarious, distorted, or substantially lost in psychotic illness is too well known to require detailed discussion. That, in addition, mounting anxiety in adult life leads to a regressive impairment of the evaluation of danger which may reach psychotic proportions, has been ably discussed (from an analytic point of view) by Max Schur (8), Greenacre (6), Gitelson (5) and others. It is also well known that patients suffering from the more severe forms of depressive illness (i.e., manic depressive psychoses and involutional depression) often experience a related impairment of reality testing characterized by somatic delusions and/or paranoid ideas of a wide variety. As the need for a conference like this clearly indicates, many questions still remain unanswered as to how far the predisposition to such regressive impairment is determined by innate constitutional factors, biological changes coincident with different phases of the life cycle, and specific factors determined during phases of psychological development.
Without in any way discounting the possible, or indeed probable, importance of all of these, the main purpose in this paper is to consider the degree to which the predisposition to different forms of affective disturbance in adult life may be attributable to certain aspects of the original developmental process. The major premise put forward concerns the importance of the quality and stability of the object relationships which decisively influence the first ego identifications and the basic self-esteem initiated in early childhood. It is the author's thesis that subsequent responses to experiences which involve threatened or actual object loss, substantial frustration, or serious disappointment are inevitably associated with painful affect-i.e., separation anxiety and/or depression as an ego state characterized by substantial loss of self esteem. Such painful affects have been repeatedly observed in the analytic situation. Whether, and how far, individual patients are capable of developing and tolerating such anxiety and/or depression appears to be closely correlated with the basic confidence and the type of object relationship which determine the quality and stability of therapeutic alliance in the analytic situation. Although, as is well recognized, this alliance implies maximal demands on the more mature aspects of of the patient's psychic structure and function, it has become increasingly the author's impression that the primitive sources from which certain of these capacities originally derive is indicated by the inevitable emergence of dependence, depression, anger, and mounting anxiety when this relationship is subject to significant stress. Successful termination of analysis inevitably includes recognition, tolerance, and mastery of the depression prerequisite to optimal maturation.
A considerable expansion of the range of the author's own psychiatric practice in recent years has permitted the applying of certain hypotheses relevant to the development and tolerance of both anxiety and depression originally deduced from the practice of psychoanalysis to the evaluation and therapy of a wide spectrum of individuals, ranging from apparently healthy individuals applying to medical school, psychiatric residency, and psychoanalytic training, to patients hospitalized in psychiatric hospitals. From a clinical point of view it has been attempted to make a differentiation between the forms of sadness and/or depression commonly described as neurotic or reactive; depressive illness as a seriously disabling, well-recognized syndrome; and a type of character structure which the author would like to describe as basically depressive. The first may readily be compared to secondary anxiety and related symptom formation. The second involves first, understanding of ego regression in anxiety, and second, the clinical differentiation between overt depressive illness and other forms of psychoses. The third may be compared to the predisposition to anxiety discussed by Phyllis Greenacre (6) many years ago.
Like anxiety, depression may be understood as an effective ego response to internal or external events. In both, recognition, tolerance, and mastery of painful affect appears to be a necessary precursor of and concomitant to adaptive progressive moves towards greater psychic maturity. Conversely, relative or absolute failures in respect to, a) recogntion, b) tolerance and, (c) mastery, may lead to different clinical forms of maladaptive symptomatic illness. The potential severity of the illness, moreover, appears to be inversely related to the implicit time sequence of these three factors in terms of their developmental implications. Failure to recognize painful affect thus involves more serious implications than limited tolerance. Limited tolerance, in turn, renders the individual more vulnerable to regression or prolonged disability than relative failures in respect to mastery. Just as neurotic symptoms attributable to relative failures in respect to the mastery of internal danger have a better prognosis than symptoms attributable to the incapacity to recognize or to tolerate anxiety, so too depression attributable to failure to mobilize available resources should be differentiated; first, from problems relevant to the tolerance of depression as a basic affect, and second, from substantial inability to recognize depres-sion and the associated feelings of relative helplessness.
Whether symptomatic depression arises as a result of internal or external events, this subjective experience inevitably includes recognition of painful aspects of reality, both internal and external, and acceptance of unpleasant limitations. This usually entails significant renunciation in respect to individual self-esteem and/or expectations relevant to external sources of gratification. Individuals whose history provides substantial evidence of successful earlier achievements in these areas seldom develop symptoms which include psychotic impairment of the perception of reality. Though they may be subject to recurrent affective disturbance, they continue to function with relative success. Individuals, in contrast, who have substantiallv denied their own limitations, whose s~lf-esteem has been contingent on either successful performance or on excessive gratification, appear to be highly vulnerable to narcissistic injuries and/or object loss. Psychosis, whenever and however it becomes manifest, may thus be regarded as indicative of 'significant failure to recognize and/or to tolerate, without impairment of reality testing, the painful affect concomitant with these events. Whether, and how far, therapeutic intervention, either psychological or physical, may prove effective in individual cases appears to be a function of both the degree of early failure and the extent of regression at the time of evaluation.
It is well known however that many regressive states seen in clinical evaluation are characterized by components of both anxiety and depression. Despite the great difference between these two basic states when seen in pure culture, an area of overlap should be conceptualized. This is the form of psychic distress in which the underlying sense of helplessness integral to depression is combined with desperate attempts to obtain relief, restlessness, and somatic symptoms which may include all the psychic and somatic features of severe anxiety. Clinical practitioners know that the frantic demands of patients in states of uncontained anxiety closely resemble the agitated pressure shown by many severely depressed patients. In both, these features indicate that regressive changes in the ego have brought about substantial impairment of the capacity for maintaining stable object relations. Such regression, if it continues unchecked, may lead to ultimate loss of self-object differentiation, distortions of reality testing, and overt psychosis. If, however, feelings of helplessness and loss of self-esteem remain more evident in the presenting symptomatology than the regressive impairment of danger attributable to uncontained anxiety, sufficient self-object differentiation has been retained for the sustained experience of genuine affect-i.e., depression. In this context Ralph Greenson's (7) suggestion that the prototype of depression occurs at a more mature level of psychic development than the prototype of primary anxiety, may be cited.
This familiar area of clinical overlap, suggests that the psychoanalytic theory of affect has now proceeded beyond the sharp dichotomy between primary and secondary anxiety proposed by Freud in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (4). The findings which led to the author's earlier paper also indicated the importance of a significant intermediate area. "Between the type of anxiety or fear which is entirely successful in its stimulating effects (~ignal anxiety) and the type of anxiety which is entirely inhibiting, there is a wide range of conditions which comprise the various types of clinical anxiety and the defences against them." Maxwell Gitelson, in his 1958 paper "On Ego Distortion" referred to this proposed intermediate area, suggesting that in addition to its relevance to psychosomatic reactions, certain primitive character traits might be attributable to a related developmental failure. In this context Gitelson specifically emphasized the positive value of sustained object hunger as prophylactic against ultimate psychic disaster or Freud's traumatic situation. A developmental approach to depression suggests that the critical developmentallevel for the initiation of the capacity to recognize and to tolerate some degree of depressive affect occurs during a phase in which anxiety is neither to be understood as the total response to a traumatic situation, nor as the signal of an internal danger situation. This period is characterized by externally directed objective anxiety, i.e., object hunger, frequently shown by the responses to threatened or actual separation from an important real object. To illustrate by a well-known example, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (3), Freud described the behaviour of a healthy baby in the second year of life which specifically related to his efforts to master periods of separation from his mother. His success indicates that all three aspects of the development and mastery of depression had been at least partially initiated; namely, first the child had been able to perceive an unpleasant reality, namely separation from his mother; second, he had attempted to tolerate the reality in question; and third, he had mobilized certain active resources, utilizing a realistically available substitute object in an attempt to master his own sense of subjective helplessness.
Genuine mastery of separation and disappointment thus demands at least three crucial steps which may be formulated in terms of the reality principle and the adaptive hypothesis. The healthy, mature individual, it may be suggested, has worked through certain crucial experiences which have led to the acceptance of both his own and others' limitations. This enhances the capacity to tolerate, without significant regression, depressive affect attributable to later experiences of loss, disappointment, and frustration. The developmental task is not, however, limited to the experience of disappointment and continued passive resignation. It also requires the capacity to initiate new adaptive moves towards available sources of real gratification. There is much to suggest that these developmental tasks are initiated between the end of the first year of life and the onset of the genital oedipal situation. They are not completed and are typically rearoused with progressive mastery, in optimal development in adolescence, early maturity, situational stress and later important developmental experiences.
Many clinical examples might be cited to illustrate the expression of anxiety, rage, and misery which may be shown by many healthy children when they are faced with undeniable and somewhat protracted separation from an important person during this period of psychological development. Self-object differentiation, object relationships, and the capacity for early identification have been achieved. Neither the sense of personal identity nor the capacity to maintain self-esteem and basic trust are sufficient to withstand significant stress. Continued absence of an important person, therefore, presents a vital threat to which the child responds with anxiety and rage. Such behaviour, although disturbing at the time, is not necessarily pathological and need not lead to disastrous or irreversible consequences. With the passage of time and further healthy development the child will be able to respond with sadness and resignation, however transient, rather than with rage and desperation. This capacity to accept disappointment and/or separation with an appropriate degree of sadness and resignation implies control of anger, rage, and increasingly regressive expressions of anxiety. Its contingency on the security of the object relations which determine basic trust and positive ego identifications, are suggested by the role of these same factors in the analytic situation. Subjective experiences o'f relative helplessness and associated depression can only be tolerated if first, self-object differentiation is maintained and second, neither self nor object are experienced in an all or nothing fashion, either positive or negative. Unless and until this developmental task has been achieved the individual is unable to recognize, let alone tolerate, the degree of depression appropriate to inevitable experiences of separation, frustration and loss. Depressive affect may, as a result, be overshadowed in predisposed individuals by loss of control, impaired judgment, psychosis, suicide, or murder.
Elucidation of the manifold factors which determine the initiation and integration of this capacity during early development is outside the scope of this presentation. It is to be hoped that longitudinal stu~ies currently in process will throw considerable light on the complex interactions between innate and experiential variables. The significance, however, of continued failure into adult life must be familiar to every psychiatrist who has treated the difficult group of patients variably diagnosed as schizo-affective, bor?erline characters, primitive oral hysterics, and the group which have been described as depressive characters. The treatment. of such patients is typically characterized bv excessive demands and regressive responses to inevitable periods of separation. The relative ease with which regression in such patients may result in projection, distortion and disastrous impulsive action, not infrequently leads to a mental status which is temporarily overtly psychotic.
To cite a clinical example; (also referred to in "Depression and the Incapacity to Bear it") (10): A former patient continued for many years to return for emergency help. Although she had been able to make use of the help of other psychiatrists to a limited degree she had never accepted separation from me as an established reality. As long as she could re-establish contact, even by telephone, she could reverse repeated episodes of acute depression and anxiety without serious regressive behaviour. This patient, however, moved to a part of the world where personal contact was not directly available. After a short time she became anxious and depressed. She sought psychiatric help with no relief. Her mounting symptoms included a combination of anxiety, rage, impulsive behaviour and depression which became increasingly intolerable. The regressive c,ourse of her illness may be indicated by quotations from her letters: "I've become exceedingly anxious--I become more and more afraid to reach out and so I withdraw-I'm getting worse. I wake up at 5: 30 every morning feeling flooded with panic, shaky, scared and weepy; I do less and less, I withdraw more and more, feel more and more helpless. I'm terribly worried-do you think I should return to the States and be hospitalized? I'm a drag on everyone around me and most unhappy ...". Arrangements had in fact been made for the patient to return when she suddenly changed her mind. The trust implicit to the request for help which had been apparent in the first letter had not been sustained. She developed delusional ideas in which she suspected that I was plotting to hospitalize her in order to prevent a possible inheritance. Her rage, anxiety and incapacity to tolerate depression led to acute overt psychosis and to a long period of hospitalization. In her last letter she foresaw her own downfall: "My troubles are now my fears and fantasies but I feel like I'm rushing headlong into making them terrible realities."
A detailed account of this patient's history and treatment is not within the scope of this paper. It is perhaps sufficient to state that despite considerable evidence of both early developmental failure and subsequent environmental stress, she had made substantial progress over many years. Her adjustment and adaptation, however, remained precarious, punctuated by brief periods of acute panic with depressive features. These panic states typically reversed readily after brief verbal contact. It was only when direct personal communication became impossible that her failure to contain or tolerate separation and helplessness led to serious ego-regression and psychotic behaviour. Responses similar to those which may be short-lived, reversible and within the normal range of infantile behaviour for the child was long-standing, psychotic, and disastrous for the adult. They represented, in effect, a regression of the ego compounded by early developmental failure specifically related to intolerance of relative helplessness, separation, and acceptance of the limitations of reality. As she regressed further she was no longer able to recognize the subjective basis of her fears. She then lost the capacity for genuine self-object differentiation and reality testing.
The author first saw this patient nearly sixteen years ago when she was an impulse-ridden, manipulative late adolescent. Although her life situation was difficult and frustrating, she showed neither depressive affect on the one hand nor a significant capacity to .control anxiety on the other. During the course of treatment her acting out diminished, and she was able to contain anxiety to a degree which enabled her partially to resolve a number of important conflicts. She never completed the developmental tasks which determine the capacity to work through the depressive affect which I believe to be essential to successful termination of treatment. Underlying resentment, anger and a sense of rage thus persisted, implicitly if not explicitly. It was this crucial failure that maintained a highly ambivalent transference residuum usually expressed in the most glowing positive terms. In times of stress, direct communication enabled her to feel accepted and thus to recover her equilibrium. When this proved impossible, she could not contain the underlying negative feelings.
This case history implies possible parallels between development phases and ego-regression in adult life. The differences, however, should also be emphasized. Transient acute explosions in young children are to be anticipated in the course of normal development. The regressive emergence of related affect in adult life, however, raises varied and controversial questions. This patient, for example, certainly showed the importance of uncontrolled aggression in both depression and delusion formulation. Her family background and whole life history make it impossible to exclude genetic, constitutional and biological factors, all of which may have been operative at the time of crucial decompensation. Whatever the major precipitating factor, it may be stated with some certainty that she proved herself incapable of maintaining self-object differentiation and reality testing in a setting which involved continued awareness of her own helplessness in the absence of a vitally important object. Her developmental failure concerned primarily the capacity for renunciation and sadness. An increasingly primitive anxiety, therefore, overshadowed depression, which as a result was not tolerated as a sustained affective experience. Despite this serious vulnerability she had nevertheless been able, over J a period of many years, to obtain relief and thus to avoid serious regression through brief verbal contact with a trusted therapist. She has subsequently, after a period of serious regression, reconstituted to her previous level of adjustment with another psychiatrist and accepted definitive separation from the author without resentment or suspicion. It is nevertheless probable that continued availability of a therapist represents an indispensible prerequisite for the maintenance of her autonomous ego functions.
It may be suggested that more serious failures in respect to this developmental task may be a factor relevant to the predisposition to schizophrenic illness. This is consistent with the positive prognostic implications attached to manifestations of depression coincident with the initiation of real object investment in the treatment of many psychotic patients. The author is currently treating a young woman who has been overtly schizophrenic for more than ten years. Although she has frequently been apathetic and withdrawn, it is only now, after four years' treatment, that she is expressing separation anxiety in the form of manifest preoccupation with the interests, history and whereabouts of a real person-the therapist. It must also be recognized that this first developmental step, unless and until it is accompanied and followed by the others -i.e., tolerance and mastery-is not complete. Individuals, therefore, capable of recognizing and tolerating some degree of depression may nevertheless remain predisposed to a wide variety of depressive symptoms if the developmental tasks have not been successfully completed.
The little boy cited by Freud in
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (3) recognizing, at least implicitly, that he minded separation from his mother, invented a game which in essence converted a passive experience of unwanted loss into an active game in which he had control. Related mechanisms are frequently seen in the treatment and psychoanalysis of patients limited in their tolerance of separation and/or frustration. How often, for example, do certain patients arrange circumstances which will make it necessary for them to leave for a vacation before the date set by the therapist? How often is the life history of such patients characterized bv unmastered real losses and repeated separations which they have initiated. Such behaviour is particularly characteristic of patients whose predisposition to depression is a basic character trait. Their suffering is real but it has often come about as a result of their own profound pessimism. The first developmental steps have been made; i.e., painful reality is recognized. Basic trust, however, and positive ego identifications are overshadowed, in such cases, not primarily by regressive forms of anxiety but by relatively low self-esteem, and a sense of inevitable rejection and loss which diminishes motivation towards utilizing available resources which might lead to positive mastery and optimal maturation. Though seriously predisposed to depression, many individuals of this character structure are nevertheless capable of real object loss and can, with appropriate help, achieve a genuine therapeutic alliance in either psychotherapy or analysis.
The predisposition to depression in such cases may be compared and contrasted to the predisposition to anxiety delineated by Phyllis Greenacre (6) . In both, the predisposition to affective disturbance appears attributable to stages of psychic development which precede the appearance of psychic structure necessary for the development of anxiety as the signal of internal danger. The predisposition in both must therefore be distinguished from the form and content of the essential neurosis. Greenacre attributes the predisposition to anxiety to "pre--natal, natal, or immediate post-natal experiences-or the combination of this with constitutional factors ... which favours an inadequate development of the sense of reality and furnishes additional predisposition to the development of especially severe neuroses or borderline states." This statement is compatible with much that the author has said in respect to the relation between the perception of reality and the initiation of the capacity to recognize painful subjective experience. The predisposition to depression, however, is determined somewhat later at a level of development subsequent to genuine selfobject differentiation. Underlying depressive character structure is therefore frequently compatible with considerable developmental achievement in many areas.
Manifest depression, moreover, does not always imply serious developmental failure. It may sometimes be deceptive in the reverse direction. Substantial success in respect to the basic developmental tasks may, as indicated in the opening remarks, be partially undermined at a later period by manifest symptomatology and/or restrictions imposed by neurotic solutions of the infantile neurosis. Regression, when it thus initiates symptom formation of an inhibiting, distressing nature, often leads to manifest guilt, shame and loss of self-esteem. Depression may thus be noted as a major presenting symptom in the initial evaluation of patients suffering from hysterical and obsessional neuroses who are potentially suitable for psychoanalytic treatment. Such patients frequently require and respond to brief preliminary psychotherapy which re-establishes sufficient self-esteem to facilitate positive therapeutic alliance. Their relative vulnerability to depression must be recognized during the course of treatment since maintenance of therapeutic alliance is a prerequisite to significant progress.
A brief clinical example will illustrate this last point.
A childless married woman of 2& sought consultation with the presenting complaint of depression related to her inability to become pregnant, despite considerable gynecological investigation and active efforts There had been recent family pressure on her to consider adopting a baby. At the time of initial evaluation this patient appeared to be quite seriously depressed. She expressed ideas of unworthiness, felt that her apparent sterility exposed her as an unsuccessful woman, acknowledged considerable conflict about her feminine role, and expressed guilt and self-reproach concerning her ambivalence. It became clear that she had been handicapped for many years by severe obsessional symptoms. Unless she could perform perfectly any task she undertook, she felt an utter failure. Whenever she accepted positions involving responsibility, she became so caught up in her perfectionism that she went through alternate waves of over-activity and almost complete paralysis. She had been able to profit somewhat from an earlier period of psychotherapy which had terminated before her marriage. Her failure to produce a family, however, had resulted in considerable decompensation, which in turn led to depression, guilt, and self-reproach.
Depressive symptomatology so dominated the clinical picture in the first interview that the possibility of insight therapy seemed remote. The patient showed a good capacity to form a relationship, however. In addition, by the third interview she showed a capacity for self-scrutiny and a sense of humour that had not been evident at the outset. During a brief period of preparatory therapy while she took steps to deal with a physical condition that might have interfered with conception, the patient showed steady improvement. Despite the readiness with which she expressed feelings of inadequacy and self-devaluation, she was also able to recognize the grandiosity of her egoideal and to attempt to modify the demands she imposed on herself. Within approximately three months this patient had recovered from a depressive symptomatology that represented decompensation of an obsessional neurosis. She was then referred to a colleague who subsequently reported satisfactory progress toward a traditional psychoanalysis.
Recognition and acceptance of realistic limitations, the first developmental step relevant to the capacity to experience depression, is intimately linked with the reality principle as defined in The Two Principles of Mental Functioning. It is prerequisite to the passive component of psychic maturity which must be available for genuine learning, creativity and the analytic process. The subsequent mobilization of available resources though at first outwardly directed, as in Freud's illustration (3), is also closely related to the later responses to signal anxiety. Active and passive responses are thus first initiated at a period which precedes clearly sexualized conflict. The intimate reaction of each with specific sexual functions appears to playa significant role in determining the type of developmental failure most frequently encountered in men and women. Overt depression and depressive character are widely recognized to occur far more frequently in patients of the female sex. Conversely a premium on lack of fear and denial of potential helplessness, similar to that which predisposed young men to traumatic neuroses, has been encountered more often in the evaluation and treatment of men than of women.
To illustrate this point I should like to quote from "Depression and the Incapacity to Bear It" (10) : " A total of 72 patients (42 women and 30 men) who had been treated or whose treatment had been supervised over a period of three years, was reviewed in respect to their capacity, a) genuinely to recognize depressive affect; b) to tolerate depression without significant ego regression; and, c) to initiate and maintain active adaptive efforts based on genuine mastery of depression. Results obtained tended to confirm a clinical impression that the developmental failures leading to areas of vulnerability may be significantly different in the two sexes. Of 42 women, 23 complained of manifest depression at the time of initial evaluation. Only SLX of the 30 men acknowledged depressive affect. During the course of treatment all but eight of the women developed, relatively early in treatment, manifest depression and separation anxiety. Only 14 men, in contrast, acknowledged either of these affects until treatment had continued for many months. Several of them in fact only became aware of depression during the terminal phases of a long, intensive psychoanalysis.
"Eight of the women and sixteen of the men showed considerable difficulty in acknowledging either depression or separation anxiety. Of these eight women, only two came within the group of individuals for whom psychoanalysis could be recommended. Both of these were active professional women with some manifest masculine character traits. The other six were far more disturbed. At best, they could be described as infantile neurotic character disorders with minimal capacity to experience or tolerate genuine emotion. The others were 'as if' personalities, hypomanic, paranoid or overtly schizophrenic. Of the sixteen men less than half were as disturbed as these six women. The others were active obsessional, often counterphobic characters, several of whom have been successfully analyzed. The developmental failure in these men was relative and limited, and the character structure of several readily comparable to that of many war neurotics before the traumatic experience. These men, although potentially vulnerable to trauma or narcissistic injury, were not seriously disturbed or in any sense borderline.
"The theoretical significance of these empirical findings is suggestive and in no way conclusive since it is based on retrospective evaluation. Nevertheless the fact that only fourteen of thirty male patients developed manifest depression, contrasts considerably to the ready availability of depressive affect in 34 out of 42 women. The relative preponderance in this sample of pro!essional people seeking therapy or analysis for non-therapeutic reasons may weight this sample to a considerable degree. It should be noted that a number of the women who were included also fall into the same professional groups. Comparison between the professional men and women I have personally seen or treated continues to reveal considerable differentiation in respect to the recognition of subjective depressive affect. This sample of 72 patients was drawn from a very general psychiatric practice including at one extreme the professional group already noted, and at the other patients sufficiently disturbed to have required hospitalization before they were seen in evaluation. It may be stated with some conviction that the author's own recent clinical experience suggests that intolerance and/or non-recognition of depressive affect is not uncommon in the evaluation of potentially analyzable male patients. Further examination of the depressed group of men suggests that these have fallen to a considerable degree into a group of patients more disturbed than the depressed women. Those who have been analyzed have revealed themselves as passive, dependent characters with significant problems in the areas of masculine identification. More disturbed depressed male patients have frequently been seen in a state of decompensation, i.e., psychotic depression, which was highly suggestive of significant incapacity to tolerate depressive affect.
"The large sample of male traumatic neuroses referred to in the earlier paper also revealed a relative incapacity in this specific area. In addition to the absence of overt anxiety, their premorbid history typically revealed denial of passivity, depression and realistic limitations. A related problem during the analysis of superficially well-adapted male patients may lead to serious problems in achieving the degree of passive dependence in the analytic situation which is indispensable to the analytic process. Insight into the meaning of the transference neurosis inevitably involves some recognition of passive wishes, acceptance of the limitations of reality and related narcissistic injury. As analysis proceeds in patients of this type, relative intolerance of passivity and depression frequently derives from neurotic defences established in the solution of the infantile neurosis. Defences, in essence, which reinforce active achieve-ment to the relative exclusion of passivity and dependence may, in some individuals, involve relative intolerance of both anxiety and depression. In men of this type who prove to be analyzable the developmental tasks had been successfully initiated in early childhood. Passive acceptance of reality with its depressive implications had later been overshadowed by the degree of active adaptation so often regarded as synonymous with masculinitv. As a result, realistic limitations had been under-estimated; anxiety and depression had not been allowed to become manifest. Areas of potential vulnerability to narcissistic injury had thus been hidden. These re-emerged during the analysis of the transference neurosis.
"The premium on activity so widely associated with the masculine ego ideal may well reinforce the second phase of the developmental task in the growth of little boys. It is hardly surprising that adult intolerance of passivity and depression may be compatible with substantial mental health and a favourable response to psychoanalysis in many men. In women the developmental problem is strikingly different. Passivity rather than activity is generally associated with the sexualized image of women. The experiences of the first developmental phase, i.e., passive recognition, are therefore reinforced by a passive feminine identification. The active components of the mastery of depression are equally necessary for both sexes. The masculine implications of activity, ego syntonic to almost all men, further active achievement in non-sexualized areas. In contrast, failure to distinguish between activity directed towards autonomous ego adaptation and activity which has sexualized masculine implications, frequently interferes with the optimal development of many little girls. Conflicts in respect to the initiation or completion of the second part of the developmental task may thus he shown by the exaggerated sense of passivity and helplessness shown by certain women. A typical syndrome very familiar in clinical practice includes a character structure with many depressive features and neurotic symptoms which appear to be essentially hysterical. The large majority of the women included in this study could both develop and tolerate a considerable degree of depression. Their capacity to mobilize ego-acceptable active resources was significantly impaired. Certain men, conversely, relying too heavily on these same resources, had substantially prevented themselves from developing the equally important passive components of mature psychological experience.
"Over-sexualization of both activity and passivity is relevant to our understanding of the predisposition to depression in relation to the castration anxiety of men and the penis envy of women. In both sexes significant failure in respect to the earlier developmental task leads to an intolerance of depression which precludes successful therapeutic analysis. In men, unconscious fantasies of omnipotence may determine a premium on continued successful achievement which may lead to serious depressive illness during the involutional period. In women, body phallus identification and/or fantasies of a hidden magical penis may have more ominous implications. Where the developmental failure is less significant the relative success achieved during the pregenital period may subsequently be disguised by regressive character defences initiated during the later stages of the infantile neurosis. Since this latter group of patients includes many for whom psychoanalysis is the treatment of choice, the differentiation between the milder and the more disturbed group must be regarded as extremely important."
In brief, I am suggesting that the widespread dichotomy-passivity, femininity us. activity, masculinity-needs careful examination. Optimal psychic maturity involves in both sexes the capacity to accept perceptions which cannot be modified. The mobilization of active responses to both internal and external challenges is equally vital.
A conceptual differentiation and a developmental sequence has been proposed in this paper namely, recognition, tolerance, and mastery. It is not wished to imply that all three factors may not be combined or that the dichotomy active vs. passive implies mutual exclusiveness. Patients, for example, approaching the termination of a successful analysis may at one and the same time continue to enjoy their increased resources while their dreams and associations express depressive anxiety in respect to impending separation. Realistic acceptance and genuine sadness within the analytic situation does not, in this context, imply helplessness or profound depression, but rather the passive component of emotional maturity which will continue to serve as prophylactic against future pathological responses to loss and disappointment.
Some material from an analytic patient, for example, termination of whose analysis is discussed in some detail in "Depression and the Incapacity to Bear It" (10) may be cited as an illustration of depression as a maturational experience. She dreamed that she had undergone an operation-It did not hurt-and something had been removed. It seemed to have a cylindrical shape. The startling thing was that she did not feel as if anything had changed or been taken out. She associated to a close friend who, despite crippling illness, had remained essentially the same person. She no longer felt terrIfied at the thought of illness or operation. having recognized that she could remain the same person even if something were taken away. She then said, with a start of recognition, that even if she realized that something had never been there she could still be a whole person. She thus no longer felt so threatened by many of the things that had previously worried her so much. She particularly emphasized attitudes towards illness, damage and finally separation.
This dream and her associations indicate an acceptance of reality in respect to penis envy. We should also note that this acceptance of realistic limitations in a specific area was intimately related to the emergence of contained depressive affect relevant to imminent separation and object loss. The author has regarded no analysis in her experience as successfully terminated in which comparable depressive emotions have not been experienced and mastered. Termination of analysis thus includes some measure of sorrow and renunciation. It also includes acceptance of the inevitable. Finally, it is an essential prerequisite to the active adaptive capacity to utilize available resources essential for the future mastery of inevitable frustration and loss.
To summarize very briefly: the predisposition to depression has been discussed in relation to its developmental significance. The capacity to experience subjective depression as an ego experience does not precede self-object differentiation. The initiation of this capacity is closely related to that aspect of the reality principle which concerns passive acceptance of recognized limitations of reality. Failures limiting this capacity are frequently associated with various psychological mechanisms, e.g., projection and denial, which substantially prevent the subjective experience of personal helplessness and realistic limitations. The passive acceptance of limitations, although a necessary preliminary to optimal adaptation, does not in itself achieve this end. Passive acceptance of essential limitations must be succeeded by the mobilization of resources towards the achievement of realistic goals. Developmental failures predisposing individuals to chronic or psychotic depression have been considered in relation to these different developmental tasks. However great the individual capacities may be for passive acceptance and/or active achievement, limitations must be recognized and mastered during every important maturational stage of development. Mature passive acceptance of the real must always remain an essential prerequisite to the adaptive mobilization of available re-sources. Partial failures in respect to either developmental task may be consistent with a considerable degree of external adaptation. Both nevertheless represent potential vulnerabilities which become increasingly relevant during the later years of life. Understanding, therefore, of the developmental features which predispose individuals met in a wide variety of evaluative situations has not only therapeutic but also potential prophylactic implications.
